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Abstract
Surveillance is recognized as a social phenomenon that is commonplace, employed by govern-
ments, companies and communities for a wide variety of reasons. Surveillance is fundamental in
cybersecurity as it provides tools for prevention and detection; it is also a source of controversies
related to privacy and freedom. Building on general studies of surveillance, we identify and analyse
certain concepts that are central to surveillance. To do this we employ formal methods based on
elementary algebra. First, we show that disparate forms of surveillance have a common structure
and can be unified by abstract mathematical concepts. The model shows that (i) finding identities
and (ii) sorting identities into categories are fundamental in conceptualizing surveillance. Secondly,
we develop a formal model that theorizes identity as abstract data that we call identifiers. The
model views identity through the computational lens of the theory of abstract data types. We
examine the ways identifiers depend upon each other; and show that the provenance of identifiers
depends upon translations between systems of identifiers.
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Introduction
Surveillance is an integral part of everyday life as many technologies
employed in our physical and virtual environments have long been
capable of monitoring and recording our activities cf. [1]. The ubiq-
uitous cameras that monitor our physical environment, in order to
improve the safety and security of people and property, are but the
most visible tip of the surveillance iceberg. The invisible bulk is
made of software that record data about actions and events cf. [2].
Our professional lives have long been conducted through software
systems, and recently, our personal lives have become dependent on
software systems through social media. Our home and neighbour-
hood environments are next to succumb to software, through the
internet of things, e.g. [3, 4, 5]. That our lives are being captured
and represented by digital data, collected by many independent
sources for different purposes, is an important sociological phenom-
enon. The translation of all kinds of data into digital form, and the
aggregation and unification of all kinds of data sources through
computer networks are important technological phenomena.
Surveillance is enormously controversial as it impacts on the
multitude of notions that make up privacy and freedom for individu-
als; on the conduct of economic and social life of societies; and on
the legal, political, and military foundations of the state [6, 7]. With
this broad view, David Lyon has given a general description of sur-
veillance as ‘the focused, systematic and routine attention to per-
sonal details for purposes of influence, management, protection
or detection’ [8, 14]. In establishing surveillance as a general
social issue, Lyon has proposed that surveillance has three main
purposes [8]:
i. keeping control, which is the historic purpose pursued by
employers, police, and government;
ii. social sorting, pursued by companies in marketing and manag-
ing customers; and
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iii. mutual monitoring, pursued in peer to peer in social networks,
real and virtual.
Thanks to the ubiquity of digital technologies, the aims and
methods of social sorting — the categorization of personal data — is
becoming most prominent.
In this article, we examine theoretically the general ideas of sur-
veillance and one of its component concepts that of identity. Identity
is fundamental to contemporary surveillance practices [9, 10, 11].
Surveillance technologies rely on identity management systems to
provide information, which vary in accuracy.1 For instance, for
social sorting to work, identity needs to be just precise enough to
enable categorizations to be useful in an application.
We seek completely abstract models that can be formalized and
analysed mathematically. First, we develop a general definition of
surveillance that captures the notion in diverse situations, and we
illustrate the general definition with some disparate examples. This
definition shows that the three main types of surveillance have the
same structures, and that the essence of surveillance is indeed sorting
and categorization. Our analysis applies to entities that are objects
or people, real or virtual, belonging to a specific context.
A most important component idea of our definition of surveil-
lance is that of the identity of the people or objects observed. We
introduce the general concept of identifiers, which are data designed
to recognize an entity. Here is our idea:
Informal Definition. An identifier for an entity is data that is
associated with the entity for the purposes of distinguishing it
among other entities in some context and for some purpose.
Identifiers are the main focus of our paper. As a starting point
for our conceptual analysis, we assume that:
Principle. Entities are recognised only through the data that act
as their identifiers for a context. Entities are observed only
through the data that represent their behaviour in a context.
This hypothesis is widely applicable. First, the surveillance con-
text is determined by selecting aspects of an entity’s behaviour that
can be captured in data, and by observations made by testing for
attributes of the data. Secondly, the identity of an object is reduced
to measurements, and the identity of a person is reduced to forms of
evidence that are also data, including records of personal testimony
and formal registration, as well as biometrics [15, 16, 17]. The idea
is simpler and more palatable when one considers the virtual world,
which creates hugely many more contexts that are, and can only be,
made of data. Users have many identities, some of which they create
in a state of anonymity. The Principle is perfectly at home in the vir-
tual world of cybersecurity.
Technically, the operations and tests on identifiers combine to
make systems of identifiers. Although designed for specific contexts,
they often have unforeseen applications. Since identifiers are data,
clearly the systems of identifiers are actually examples of what com-
puter scientists call abstract data types [18, 19]. The theory of
abstract data types characterizes data through its operations and
tests, which may be specified by axioms to make them close to the
application domain and independent of implementations. The
theory uses algebra to model any form of data, and tools to design
and build software. The idea of a general theory of identity based on
abstract data types is new.
Foremost among identifiers are those that are supposed to iden-
tify people. The notion of a personal identifier proves to be as infor-
mative as it is subtle. To understand identity we need to examine the
ways identifiers are issued and how they depend upon other identi-
fiers. We show that the provenance of identifiers is an essential idea.
We consider principles of how identifiers are to be compared and
when they might be deemed equivalent; this requires notions of
translations between different systems of identifiers.
All of these concepts are motivated by some informally described
examples, and then formalized mathematically using elementary
algebra. The examples of surveillance and identity we use refer to
situations both in everyday life and in cybersecurity. The everyday
examples make the point our concepts apply to traditional forms of
identity and security. The cybersecurity examples give a glimpse of
the abundance of identity issues in securing software systems.
Identity is a central concept in hashing, encryption, communication
protocols, certification, and their roles in the maintaining the trust-
worthiness of transactions, encoding of access controls, tracing
events, forensics, etc. In their mathematical form, the concepts cre-
ate precise and general definitions that cover a great range of
examples.
The article is in two parts: on surveillance and on identity. The
Section ‘What is surveillance?’ exemplifies the central ideas infor-
mally; their formalization begins in the Section ‘A formal model of
surveillance’.
But why formalize? Formalizations make notions precise. They
uncover and classify the possible structures and interpretations of
ideas. Our formalization can be likened to the way formal logic has
long been used in philosophy to clarify the nature of truth, argu-
ments and reasoning. Later, we reflect on the role of abstract con-
cepts and formal methods to give insights in sociological contexts
(the sub-Section ‘Formalizing identity and social theory’).
Our aim is to discover general concepts and principles associated
with surveillance and to analyse them, mapping their inter-
connections and implications by means of mathematical ideas and
structures. Formalization has proved to be a fundamental practical
tool in the development of software. Formal models are needed by
technologists designing surveillance systems and their safeguards, in
order to develop tools for testing and reasoning. Such formal meth-
ods play a role in software engineering where security by design is
an objective. We believe that raising the status of identity and mod-
elling identity using abstract data types will be useful in making and
maintaining cybersecurity software.
The mathematical pre-requisites are modest.2 To address a read-
ership from different disciplines and professions, we explain some
very basic mathematical ideas. While this will seem laborious and
unnecessary to those familiar with formal methods, others may ben-
efit when ideas are shown to arise naturally in thinking about iden-
tity, and appreciate more readily the benefits that formalization
delivers.
What is surveillance?
Let us begin with an abstract informal description of a large class of
surveillance systems.
Informal Definition. A surveillance system observes the behav-
iour of people and objects in a context that may be real or virtual.
1 For example, in the UK, accurate identification of an individual usually
depends on a passport [11], a driver’s licence (DVLA) and, for some, the
National Identity Register [12]. Accuracy increases if identification involves
fingerprints [13], iris scans [14] and DNA [15]; see also [16].
2 The mathematical ideas we use use to launch our models are sets, functions
and relations, which are described in any number of textbooks on discrete
mathematics, e.g. [20, 21]. The theory of abstract data types is more demand-
ing algebraically, e.g. [18].
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The surveillance system classifies behaviours by means of attributes,
and identifies people and objects with those attributes. A surveil-
lance system consists of the following components and methods:
1. Entity. Entities that possess behaviour in space and time.
2. Observable behaviour. Methods for obtaining and recording
data about behaviours.
3. Attribute. Methods for defining and recognizing attributes of
behaviour data.
4. Identity. Methods for generating data that identifies entities in
the context.
In practice, what is observable about the behaviour are the
attributes of data; these characterize the context for the surveillance.
Depending upon the context, we may expect the attributes to be
based upon laws, rules, norms, conventions, policies, practices,
expectations, etc. Indeed, when the purpose of surveillance is con-
trol, they may seek to catch deviations. The definition is neutral and
does not imply deviance. The definition does require precise formu-
lations of attributes for a process of categorization. The data that is
used to identify entities can be numbers, texts, sounds and images.
Here are three simple examples to prepare for our abstract
formalizations.
Example 1: Control Motor — Vehicles. Automatic Number
Plate Recognition (ANPR) is a technology that observes vehicles and
records registration marks. Typical applications are checking on
vehicle speed, managing car parking and collecting tolls, cf. [22].
The technology was functioning in the late 1970s. Today, ANPR is
a component of hundreds of thousands of surveillance systems
owned by both public and private organizations.
Consider some ANPR applications in terms of our abstract defi-
nition. In such surveillance systems, the entities are vehicles at a par-
ticular location and time. The vehicles may be in motion (as with
speed checks), or may be arriving or leaving a location (as with car
parking and congestion zones in cities). The vehicles are observed by
cameras that create images and the software that processes the
images varies according to the behavioural attributes under observa-
tion (e.g. breaking an average speed limit over a stretch of road, or
overstaying a parking time limit). In particular, optical character
recognition establishes the registration mark of vehicles. A registra-
tion mark is an alpha-numeric name that identifies a vehicle
uniquely in a human-centred way in a national register of vehicles.
The mark links to information about the characteristics of the
vehicle. Thus, to the surveillance system, the identity of an entity is
this registration mark. For example, a surveillance system for car
parking based on an ANPR has the form:
Entity: Cars
Observable Behaviour: The registration mark, its time of arrival
and departure at the location
Attributes: Duration of stay above a particular limit
Identity: Registration marks
Following the ANPR stages described above, the registration mark
is communicated to a database relevant to the application. For exam-
ple, the database may be used to check an attribute, such as a payment
(tax, charge or toll), having been made for that registration mark.
The surveillance system knows the identity of the car, but not
necessarily the driver.
Suppose we take the entities to be people. To find the driver, an
independent process involving only personal identities begins. The
vehicle is registered to a person called the keeper of the vehicle, who
must be located and contacted. In the UK, the operator of the
surveillance system communicates the registration mark to the
Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA), or to one of its
approved agents, to determine the name and address of the keeper.
The output of these actions is the identity of the keeper. Indeed, in
this necessary second stage, there is a transformation of identity
data from the registration mark to the name and address of the
keeper. Note that finding the actual driver may require further inde-
pendent action. In the case of speeding, where laws are involved, the
driver’s record will contain characteristics such as a driving penalty
history.
Example 2: Social Sorting — Customer Accounts. Consider a cli-
ent’s e-account with some provider, such as a bank or shop.
Typically, an account has the following components: an account
number that identifies the account; a user name and password as a
form of identity used to gain access to the account; a set of charac-
teristics of the account, such as personal details and the scope and
limits of services; and an account history that records past transac-
tions and allows for new transactions, queries, preferences, etc. The
account history is the behaviour of the account; it is observed to
check that terms and conditions are met by the client, or that no
unusual pattern of transactions has been carried out, or to generate
suggestions for new products and services. Observations might also
include standard monitoring data about user logins and login
attempts, duration, location, etc. For example:
Entities: Credit card accounts
Observable Behaviour: Transactions: date, payee, location, sum,
etc.
Attributes: Credit limit, minimum payments, unusual
transactions
Identity: Credit card number
Example 3: Mutual Monitoring — Social Media Accounts.
Social media connect people who have personal or professional
interests in common. Systems such as Facebook, Twitter, WeChat,
Instagram, LinkedIn, and Academia.edu attract large numbers of
users. Individuals register with a system and create an account and a
network of other users to suit their needs. Abstractly, an account
has a structure similar to that of a customer account for a bank or
shop. The behaviour of the account is a history of postings, status
updates, linkages and interactions. In social networking, individuals
voluntarily reveal very detailed information about themselves to
their networks, including their personal history, tastes, opinions and
activities; the behaviours could be termed personas. From the point
of view of surveillance, two phenomena are of interest: (i) individu-
als can and do watch over people in their networks, and (ii) the data
of the account holders belong to companies that can collect and use
the information for commercial or other purposes. Illustrating the
components:
Entities: Member accounts
Observable Behaviour: Personal declarations, posts, comments,
connections, location, etc.
Attributes: Targeted opinions in posts on specific topics, interac-
tions with other members, unusual interactions
Identity: Usernames
A formal model of surveillance
We have defined surveillance informally as a process that identifies
entities on detecting certain properties of their behaviour. We will
define this process formally.
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Context: entities and their behaviour
Let Entity be a set of entities whose behaviour is to be observed. Let
Behaviour be the set of all possible behaviours in space and time of
all the entities of Entity. The nature of behaviour and its models we
consider in stages.
Deterministic Behaviour. Suppose that each entity e 2 Entity has
one and only one behaviour in space and time, i.e. its behaviour is
deterministic. In this case, there is a single-valued mapping
[[_]]: Entity! Behaviour
such that
[[e]] ¼ the behaviour of the entity e 2 Entity.
The mapping provides a formal model or semantics for the behav-
iour of the entity. Taken together we have formalized a context for
the surveillance as an algebraic structure:
Context¼ (Entity, Behaviour j [[_]]: Entity! Behaviour).
Non-deterministic Behaviour. Suppose that each entity has more
than one possible behaviour in space and time, i.e. its behaviour is
non-deterministic. In this case, there is a relation
[[_]]: Entity  Behaviour
such that
[[e, b]] () b 2 Behaviour is a possible behaviour of the entity
e 2 Entity.
The context for the surveillance is a relational structure
Context¼ (Entity, Behaviour j [[_]]: Entity  Behaviour).
Alternately, in the non-deterministic case, if the elements of
Behaviour are sets of possible behaviours of an entity, the relation
can be replaced with a map returning sets.
We will focus on the deterministic case. The behaviours need to
be modelled formally. How might this be done? There are several
options.
Behaviour as streams of data
A way to formalize behaviours is to think of entities performing a
sequence of actions or events taking place in time.
Let Time be a set of time points generated by a clock of some
kind; for example, say Time¼ {0, 1, 2, . . ., t, . . .}. Let Action be a set
of actions or events characteristic of the entities. The behaviour of
an entity is conceived of as a stream
a(0), a(1), a(2), . . ., a(t), . . .
of actions or events in time, where a(t) 2 Action for all t 2 Time.
Such sequences will be termed traces:
Definition. A trace is an association of actions or events to time
points and is formalized by a total mapping
a: Time! Action
such that for all t 2 Time
a(t) ¼ the action or event taking place at time t 2 Time.
Let Trace be the set of all possible traces.
Now in many cases, the space Behaviour of all possible behav-
iours of the entities can be taken to be a subset of the set Trace of all
possible traces; thus,
Behaviour  Trace.
When applying the behaviour mapping [[_]] to an entity e 2
Entity we get a trace, which is a map
[[e]]: Time! Action.
Therefore, for e 2 Entity and t 2 Time, we have
[[e]](t) ¼ the action or event of entity e taking place at time
t 2 Time.
Example: Twitter. Twitter processes data called tweets. At the
heart of a tweet is a message made from at most 140 characters, but
a tweet is composed of more data. For simplicity, a tweet can be
thought of as a vector of data drawn from sets of the following kind:
Text The text that is the status update.3
Identity A string that uniquely labels the tweet.
Contributor The author(s) of the tweet.
Time The time when this Tweet was created.4
Location The geographic location (longitude, latitude) of
this Tweet as reported by the user or application.5
Retweet Status and number of retweets.
Favourite Number of favourites.
We let the set of all possible tweets be
Tweet ¼ Text  Identity  Contributor  Time  Location 
Retweet  Favourite.
Now Twitter generates and processes streams of tweets, i.e.
sequences of tweets indexed by time. Thus, the behaviour can be
modelled by traces that are streams of tweets of the form
a(0), a(1), a(2), . . ., a(t), . . . 2 Tweet,
which is represented by a map a: Time ! Tweet. Let Behaviour be
the set of all possible traces of these kinds. Typical user operations
on tweets are ‘embedding tweets’, ‘responding to tweets’, and
‘favouring’, ‘unfavouring’, and ‘deleting tweets’, which induce oper-
ations on traces.
Depending upon the circumstances, monitoring tweet feeds is
called ‘curation’, ‘filtering’, or ‘surveillance’. Monitoring Twitter
can be done in a number of ways via application programming inter-
faces (APIs), which define instructions for developers to build new
systems. Twitter’s Search API allows users to define criteria (key-
words, usernames, locations, named places, etc.) to search among
existing tweets. Twitter’s Streaming API redirects a sample of
tweets, based upon a user’s criteria, as these tweets appear. The sam-
ple is less than 1% [23]. Twitter’s Firehose API delivers 100% of all
publicly available tweets that match users’ criteria as they are made.
The Twitter Firehose is complex and requires a subscription.
Twitter’s monitoring services have tools to detect non-compliance
with Twitter policies (e.g. aggressive following and unfollowing).
Identity: identifying entities
To identify entities in a context whose behaviours have certain prop-
erties, the entities need to be labelled, marked or named in some
3 Using the UTF-8 representation for Unicode.
4 Measured by Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).
5 Using the geoJSON standard.
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way. Our notion of identifier, defined in the Introduction, is
designed to do just this. 6
Each entity e 2 Entity has an identifier that is used to denote the
entity in a context. The association of identifiers with entities can be
complicated as we will see shortly. In order to formalize surveil-
lance, we must formalize the assignment of identifiers to entities.
Definition. Let Identifier be a set of possible identifiers for the
entities of Entity. There is a relation
id  Identifier  Entity
such that
id(i, e) () the data i 2 Identifier is assigned to entity e 2 E.
If id(i, e) then we say that identifier i names entity e. Let anon be
a datum that is not in the set Identifier of identifiers for the entities;
anon indicates anonymity, i.e., an entity not named. We will need
the set Identifier [ {anon}.
We will develop the notion of identifiers in the second part of the
article (the Section ‘What is identity’? onwards). Here, let us note
that since the association of identifiers to entities is a relation, thus
many identifiers can be allocated to an entity and, conversely, many
entities can have the same identifier. Later, in the Section ‘A formal
model of identity?’, we will simplify the discussion, focussing on the
case that the association is a function id: Identifier! Entity.
Surveillance: detecting attributes
The elements of Behaviour formalize the activity of the entities
under surveillance. To formalize what it is we are to detect, we sup-
pose that Prop¼Prop1, . . ., Propk is a collection of sets of behav-
iours, i.e. for 1  i  k,
Propi  Behaviour.
The entities of interest are those whose behaviours lie in some
Propi; in symbols,
Entity(Propi)¼ {e 2 Entity: [[e]]2 Propi}.
General Case. Entities in a context are known by their identi-
fiers. Formulations of surveillance can seek for any entity e satisfying
a Propi,
i. at least one identifier i for e;
ii. a subset of the identifiers of e; or
iii. all of the identifiers of e.
These options have the form of a selection or choice operation
selectid: Entity! P(Identifier)
where P(Identifier) is the set of all subsets of Identifier, and
selectid(e)  {i 2 Identifier j id(i, e)}.
Definition. Surveillance is formulated as follows: for 1  i  k
define,
Surv(Propi): Entity! P(Identifier)
for e 2 Entity by
Surv(Propi)(e)¼ selectid(e) if [[e]]2 Propi
¼1 if [[e]]62 Propi.
Note that entities whose behaviours do not lie in Propi are
mapped to the empty set 1, and are ignored and not identified, i.e.
they will remain anonymous.
Definition. An entity e in a context is anonymous under surveil-
lance with attributes Surv(Prop) if Surv(Propi)(e)¼1 for 1  i  k.
Minimal Case. Consider surveillance that seeks just one identi-
fier for any entity whose behaviour satisfies some Propi. This view
of surveillance is reformulated thus:
Definition. Surveillance is defined as follows: for 1  i  k
define,
Surv(Propi): Entity! Identifier [ {anon}
for e 2 Entity by
Surv(Propi)(e)¼ (some i) id(i, e) if [[e]]2 Propi
¼ anon if [[e]] 62 Propi.
Thus, given the collection Prop¼Prop1, . . ., Propk of properties,
surveillance is specified by a collection of functions: for 1  i  k,
Surv(Propi): Entity! Identifier [ {anon}.
If convenient, these may be combined as a k-tuple,
Surv(Prop): Entity! (Identifier [ {anon})k
where
Surv(Prop)(e)¼ (Surv(Prop1)(e), . . ., Surv(Propk)(e)).
Combining these ideas, we define formally a very general notion
of a surveillance system.
Definition. A surveillance system for entities in a context is a
structure of the form
SurvSys(Prop)¼ (Entity, Identifier [ {anon}, Behaviour j anon,
id, [[_]], Propi, Surv(Propi) 1  i  k),




and the kþ1 relations
id  Identifier  Entity,
Propi,
and the kþ1 mappings
[[_]]: Entity! Behaviour
Surv(Propi): Entity! Identifier [ {anon}
for 1  i  k.
The definition expresses a minimal general form of a surveillance
system as an algebraic structure, which is a semantic model of an
abstract data type [18]. The theory of abstract data types was cre-
ated to model the essential components of any computing system in
a precise way. Thus, designers can use algebraic methods when
thinking formally about the processes of user specification and sub-
sequent technological implementation [25]. Of course, any actual
surveillance system will involve many technologies to obtain and
6 In computing, the term ‘identifier’ is well established. It is data made of syntax
that names or labels a computational entity; commonly, it is an alphanumeric
string that defines components in a programming language, such as variables,
operators, procedures, programs etc. Our adoption of the word for data
associated with a context is essentially a large-scale generalization. The pur-
pose of the notion is close to that of the idea of a pure name in [24]. The term
is in use occasionally in some social discussions of identity.
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process data. These technologies may suggest some new abstract
components that need to be formalized and understood theoreti-
cally. Roughly speaking, system design has the following form:
Design Problem. The essence of the design problem is:
1. Specification. To define the desired surveillance system by speci-
fying an abstract data type for SurvSys(Prop).
2. Implementation. To choose technologies to generate data to
a. represent the behaviours of the entities;
b. represent the identities of the entities;
c. observe behaviours and detect those behaviours having the
attributes in Prop;
d. recognize the identity of entities having the properties in
Prop.
Surveillance and social sorting
In surveillance studies, social sorting is the categorization of people
and results in a classification used to treat people differently [26].
Although originally formulated to understand the social impact of
surveillance by companies and institutions, our formal definition
shows that sorting is essential to the abstract conception of surveil-
lance and, therefore, that sorting is inherent in the surveillance of
entities of all kinds. We will formalize the sorting of entities using
simple notions of categorization and partition; however, sorting can
be problematic because the sorting of identifiers is more complex
than the sorting of entities.
Sorting entities
In our definition of surveillance the collection Prop of properties of
entities lead to a categorization of entities that can be treated differ-
ently. What is a categorization?
Definition. Let Entity be a set of entities. A categorization of
entities is a collection of subsets
S1, S2, . . ., Sk  Entity
that include all the entities, i.e.
S1 [ S2 [ . . . [ Sk ¼ Entity.
An entity e lies in at least one of the sets and possibly several. In
this loose idea, we may have categories overlapping and having
interesting internal structure, e.g. they may be nested and form a
hierarchy under the set inclusion ordering. Commonly, and most
simply, we may want the sets not to overlap so that an entity e lies
in one, and only one, of the sets:
Definition. The categorization is a partition if for 1 n, m k,
we have Sn\Sm¼1.
Sorting identifiers
Surveillance observes data about behaviours of entities — not
entities — and recognizes only identifiers for entities — not the enti-
ties themselves. Thus, surveillance delivers a categorization of identi-
fiers, not a categorization of entities, which makes the notion subtle.
Definition. Let Identifier be a set of identifiers. A categorization
of identifiers is a collection of subsets
S1, S2, . . ., Sk  Identifier
that includes all the identifiers, i.e.
S1 [ S2 [ . . . [Sk ¼ Identifier.
Again, an identifier i lies in at least one of the sets and possibly
several. A categorization of identifiers is less likely to be a partition.
However, the structure must also be measured against the entities
that the identifiers name. Given an entity e there can be identifiers i
and j for e that lie in different sets. This means that the categoriza-
tion of identifiers does not lead directly to a neat categorization of
entities. Distinctions between different identifiers for the same entity
may be ambiguities that are meaningful. For example, data integra-
tion combines sets of identifiers from different contexts that share
the same entities. Categorizations of identifiers arise in many ways,
not least by the analysis of data sets using clustering and classifica-
tion techniques in machine learning [27]. Ideally, our categorization
of identifiers can be transformed into one that corresponds with the
entities:
Definition. The categorization S1, S2, . . ., Sk of identifiers is com-
plete for the entities if for all i, j 2 Identifier, and any 1  n  k,
if i 2 Sn and i and j name the same entity then j 2 Sn
Our definition of surveillance delivers a categorisation of identifiers,
namely:
Sn ¼ image(Surv(Propn)) – {anon}.
To make a complete categorization is a process that depends
upon knowledge of the equality of identifiers for entities (see the
sub-Section ‘Generating identifiers’). We now turn to theorizing
identity.
What is identity?
Identity has become almost purely a matter of data. People and
objects are named, numbered, labelled or otherwise denoted by data
relevant to a context. People belong to many contexts: they can be
citizens, patients, drivers, voters, employees, customers, crime sus-
pects, etc., each with different identities managed by different kinds
of identity management systems. Physical or virtual, each identity
system is based on an abstract data type of some kind.
To distinguish between entities in a context, identifiers need not
reflect any aspect of the entity or have any meaning at all, however
in practice they are loaded with information. Case studies reveal
that the following processes are fundamental:
i. creation and re-creation of identifiers;
ii. comparison of identifiers;
iii. inter-dependence of identifiers;
iv. transformation of identifiers;
v. revocation of identifiers.
Identifiers are composite objects: identifiers are commonly built
from other identifiers.
Personal identifiers are those that we rely upon to distinguish
uniquely a human being. They are guarantees of peoples’ identities
in contexts that demand physical identity. In the UK, the basic, most
rigorous personal identifiers are associated with birth, marriage and
death certificates, passports, medical and dental records, driving
licenses, National Insurance (NI) records, tax records, etc. Biometric
data — such as photographs, fingerprints, iris scans, blood groups,
and DNA — are also involved. Biometric data are physical measure-
ments, but they are represented and processed digitally.
In this section, we examine informally some concepts, principles,
and examples of identity prior to providing a formal definition and
the outline of a theory in the next sections.
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Recall from the Introduction that identifiers can be ‘any data
intended to separate entities in a context’. What is this data? For
example, a name for an entity is an identifier. By a name for an
entity we commonly mean data made from symbols. In computing
systems, there are many syntactic schemes for naming hardware and
software entities using alphanumeric strings; usually, the aim is to
make a symbolic identifier unique to the entity in a context.
The relationship between entities and identifiers can be compli-
cated. Consider these four identifier-entity ratios:
1. Many–One Associations. Each identifier is assigned to one
entity, but different identifiers can be assigned to the same
entity.
2. One–One Associations. Different identifiers are assigned to dif-
ferent entities.
3. One–Many Associations. An identifier can be assigned to more
than one entity but each entity has only one identifier.
4. Many–Many Associations. An identifier is assigned to more
than one entity and, vice versa, an entity can be assigned more
than one identifier.
Surveillance returns identifiers that can narrow the search for
entities but may not pin down the particular entity of interest.
Searches take place on identifiers and, as we have noted, that an
identifier can easily point to many distinct entities. Thus, many-to-
one associations are important because:
Search Principle. If an association is many-one then to find an
entity, we can search for any one of a set of alternate identifiers
for that entity. If an association is one-one then there is one and
only one identifier for that entity.
The following point about narrowing the search for identifiers is
obvious but certainly is profoundly important practically:
Enumeration Principle. The addition of a number, reference
code, extension tag, time stamp, or hash code may turn a many-
one association into a one-one association.
The use of numbers to uniquely distinguish entities in a context
is old and universal, helping to determine uniquely all sorts of enti-
ties, such as people (by membership numbers); invoices, orders and
payments (by reference numbers); and consumer products (by serial
and barcode numbers). Reference codes do the same using alphanu-
merical strings. The use of extension tags often structures identifiers
as paths in a tree and, like time stamps, separate entities, narrow
searches, and can isolate entities uniquely. Hashing produces long
binary or hex numbers as code for an identifier.
Example 1: Cars. Recall Example 1 in the Section ‘What is sur-
veillance?’, which illustrates one-one and many-one associations. In
the UK, each car is assigned a registration mark; the current system
was introduced on 1 September 2001. In general, each registration
mark consists of seven characters with a defined format. From left
to right, the characters consist of: (i) a local memory tag or area
code, consisting of two letters that indicates the local registration
office; (ii) a two-digit age identifier, which changes twice a year, in
March and September; and (iii) a three-letter sequence which
uniquely distinguishes each of the cars displaying the same initial
four-character area and age sequence. The association of registra-
tion marks to cars is one-one at any time. However, with permission
of the DVLA, registration marks can be transferred from one vehicle
to another. Thus, the marks are unique identifiers that are time-
dependent; they are not permanent unique identifiers for the
vehicles. There are identifiers for vehicles that are permanent: in the
UK, the vehicle identification number (VIN) consists of 17 charac-
ters that identify the manufacturer (three characters), the type of
vehicle (six characters), and finally distinguishes each of the cars
with these characteristics (eight characters). The VINs obey some
international standards.
A car has one and only one registered keeper. The registered
keeper is the person who is legally responsible for the car, and need
not to be the owner of the vehicle. One purpose of the mark is to
identify the keeper: thus, the association of a registration mark to a
keeper is unique. However, a person can be a registered keeper of as
many cars as he/she wants. Thus, the association of registration
marks to keepers is many-one. The registration document (V5) for a
car identifies the car by registration mark and VIN, and its keeper.
Many people have insurance policies that enable them to drive
any car with the owner’s permission. Thus, the driver of a car on a
particular occasion may be only loosely connected to the keeper.
The association between registration marks and drivers is compli-
cated being one-many and time dependent, and incomplete in terms
of formal documentation.
Example 2: Communications. This example demonstrates both
many-one and many-many associations. When connecting a com-
puter to the Internet, a number is needed called an Internet Protocol
(IP) address that uniquely identifies the machine in the network; this
number is 32 bits under Internet Protocol Version 4.7 In some com-
puter networks, such as networks local to an organization or com-
pany, there is an IP address for the machine that does not change;
these are called static IP addresses. In this context, the association of
computers to IP addresses is one-one. More commonly, at home, IP
addresses are generated by an Internet Service Provider in response
to a customer’s need for Internet access. Thus, over time IP addresses
can change and the association of IP addresses to a particular com-
puter is many-one. Developing this example, if more than one com-
puter is accessing the Internet at the same time in a period, from the
same service, then the association between IP addresses and com-
puters is many-many. The changing status seems to be natural in
time-dependent associations of identifiers. However, each computer
does have an identifier, called its MAC address (48 bits under IEEE
802), that identifies the device uniquely throughout its life. So, the
association is one-one and time independent.
Example 3: Addresses. This example demonstrates a one-many
association. In the UK, between 1959 and 1974, a system of postal
codes was introduced to enable the automation of postal services.
Typically, each address or location is assigned at most one postcode
but a postcode can be assigned to more than one unit or building.
The association between postcodes and buildings/addresses is one-
many. Thus, postcodes are a system of identifiers that do not
uniquely determine addresses. Local authorities determine
addresses. Postcodes have found many uses and are used routinely in
commercial transactions, navigation, and, more significantly, in cal-
culating insurance, designing social policy and funding, and aca-
demic social studies — all of which are examples of social sorting.
For any system of identifiers for entities in a context, the ques-
tions arise:
Identifier Generation. How does the system create and delete
identifiers for entities?
7 In the Internet of Things, processors are embedded in products and places of
all kinds. Thus, there is a need for many more IP addresses, prompting an
upgrade of standards from Internet Protocol Version 4 to Internet Protocol
Version 6 [28].
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Identifier Authentication. Given two identifiers, how do we
decide whether or not they are associated with the same entity?
Entity Authentication. Given an entity and identifier, how do we
verify whether or not the identifier is associated with the entity?
Entity authentication is stronger than identifier authentication.
The notion is attractive but not subtle for what does it mean to be
‘given an entity’? In much theory and practice, the entity is actually
‘given’ by means of another identifier. We examine the relationship
between identifiers in the Section ‘Comparing identifiers’.
Example 4: Physical Verification of Entities. A biometric is an
identifier that is designed to be verified by means of a physical proc-
ess of identity authentication. The physical process involves instru-
ments that make measurements, which are processed by software,
and whose specifications involve probability theory. Questions arise
about accuracy, equivalence across authenticating equipment, soft-
ware portability, and, indeed, the probabilistic assumptions.
However, the intention is clear: through biometrics, physical reality
verifies personal identity.
A formal model of identity
We now consider formally the idea of a system of identifiers for the
entities under observation. There are three aspects arising from our
discussion of examples: assigning identifiers, comparing identifiers
and basic personal identifiers. We will continue to use the formal
notations introduced earlier in our formal definition of surveillance
in the sub-Section ‘Identity: identifying entities’.
Assigning identifiers
Definition. Let Identifiers be a non-empty set of identifiers and
Entity a non-empty set of entities. Suppose that identifiers have been
assigned to entities by means of a relation
id  Identifier  Entity
such that
id(i, e) () the data i 2 I, called an identifier, is assigned to
entity e 2 E.
We define the set of entities named by identifier i by
ent(i)¼ {e 2 Entity j id(i, e)}
and the set of all identifiers naming entity e by
id(e)¼ {i 2 Identifier j id(i, e)}.
These sets are projections of the relation id.
The maps ent(i) and id(e) are needed to formalize the types of
association in the Section ‘What is identity?’. This idea is our most
general definition:
Definition. A system of identifiers is a structure,
IdSys¼ (Identifier, Entity j id  Identifier  Entity).
Example 1: Post Codes and Passwords. Recall Example 3 in the
Section ‘What is identity?’: a postcode can be assigned to more than
one building so the association is a one–many relation postcode:
PostcodeAddress. Similarly, accounts are assigned one password,
but passwords can be common to different accounts (e.g. proper
names, birthdays, etc.). The association is a one–many relation pass-
word: PasswordUsername.
Examples suggest that the following special case is most
important.
Definition. A system of identifiers IdSys is said to satisfy the
many-one property if each identifier is assigned to one and only one
entity but an entity may have more than one identifier. In this case,
the relation becomes a single-valued mapping
id: Identifier! Entity
such that
id(i) ¼ the entity e 2 Entity named by the data i 2 Identifier.
The structure becomes an algebra:
IdSys¼ (Identifier, Entity j id: Identifier! Entity).
Recalling the Search and Enumeration Principles in the Section
‘What is identity?’, we will focus on systems having this many-one
property. Since the purpose of the identifiers is to recognise the enti-
ties that we are interested in, the following equivalence relation on
Identifier is basic:
Definition. For any i1 and i2 2 Identifier, we say that they are
entity-equivalent if they are associated with the same entity: in
symbols,
i1 en i2 if, and only if, id(i1) ¼ id(i2).
The identifier captures and narrows down detection of entities.
Thus, we can strengthen the system of identifiers if we can satisfy
this condition:
Definition. A system of identifiers IdSys is said to satisfy the one-
to-one property if the map id satisfies: for any i1 and i2 2 Identifier,
if id(i1) ¼ id(i2) then i1 ¼ i2.
The map id is one-to-one or injective, and entity-equivalence en
is¼.
Example 2: Cars. Recalling Example 1 in the Section ‘What is
identity?’, the association of registration marks to cars is one–one.
Generating identifiers
How are identifiers generated for a set of entities in practice? First,
some input data is presented to the system that has to be examined
and approved according to some set of rules.
Definition. Let the initial data presented to a system in order to
create an identifier be called a form. Let Form be the set of all possi-
ble forms for the system. The creation of an identifier is a mapping
of the type:
generate: Form! Identifier.
A form f 2 Form is the background data needed to create the
identifier generate(f).
We can refine this idea by separating the processing of the data
from the release of the identifier. Let the processing of the form be
represented by a function
check: Forms! {0, 1}
that tests the data in a form f 2 Form for consistency against the sys-
tem’s rules. We assume that check(f)¼1 means the form is accepted
and check(f)¼0 means the form is rejected.
We represent the next stage — if and when an identifier is to be
issued — by a function
issue: Forms! Identifier
which uses some or all of the data in f 2 Form to make an identifier.
The two stages are represented by composing the functions to
make the new function
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generate: Forms! Identifier [ {reject}
where
generate(f) ¼ if check(f)¼1 then issue (f) else reject.
The idea of the form is seen in the familiar procedures of enrol-
ment and registration required when applying to join organizations,
schemes and services etc.
Personal identity
Of greatest interest is surveillance in which the entities are people.
A fundamental problem is how identifiers can actually identify a specific
individual. An individual’s identity involves many characteristics —
social, biographical, psychological and biometric — all of which can be
presented digitally. A person identifier is very special data as it is funda-
mental to theories of trust, privacy and surveillance. Consider some
examples of assigning data to individuals.
Examples
Example 1: Biometrics. Biometric identifiers are measurable qual-
ities that can be used to describe and label the physical characteris-
tics of individuals and enable the automatic recognition of people.
Physiological and behavioural characteristics are related to the
body, and there are many: some 9 leading biometrics, and a further
17 biometrics under development, are discussed in [16]. All of these
physical measurements end up in software. The association of a bio-
metric to people is expected to be highly reliable because it is
expected to be one-one. Biometric digital technologies emerged in
the 1960s with automatic fingerprint recognition [29, 30] – perhaps,
the best understood automatic process [31].
The operational tests used to measure biometrics are of course,
approximate, due to technical constraints, error margins and costs.
Thus, that biometric data manifests a one–one identity association is
a matter of probability, especially high probability. Increasingly
accurate measurements are desirable or necessary. Although identi-
cal twins share very similar DNA, they are not identical [32]. The
environment affects the genetics, possibly even in the womb. But the
complexity of testing is considerable and is a research area [33].
Recently, public attention was drawn to these points when identical
twins were identified by DNA evidence as suspects in a series of sex-
ual assaults, in Marseille, France, and soon after in Reading,
England. In the case of Marseille, after 10 months incarceration, one
of the twins confessed [34]; in the case of Reading, mobile phone
evidence revealed the offender [35]. At the time advanced DNA tests
were not applied to separate the twins.
Example 2: Citizenship. In the UK, for example, an individual
can or must register with state organizations devoted to health,
employment, citizenship, and transport, and with local government
organizations devoted to residence and elections. Everyone regis-
tered with the National Health Service has his/her unique number,
which is linked to his/her health record. Each NHS number is made
up of 10 alpha-numerics. Everyone gets a National Insurance (NI)
number just before he/she turns 16. An individual’s NI number
makes sure his/her NI contributions and taxes are only recorded
against her/her name. The format of the number is two prefix letters,
six digits, and one suffix letter. In the new style red passport, in
addition to the biometrics, there is a passport number that must be
nine characters and all characters must be numeric. Finally, each
driving licence has a number made up of 18 alpha-numerics, which
codes part or all of (i) the surname; (ii) the date of birth; (iii) the first
names; (iv) sex; (v) licence issue; and (vi) checks. In these cases of
registration, numbers are added to identifiers in order to ensure that
each of these associations is one–one. The ways in which the British
state knows its citizens is complicated; plans in 2006 for (re-)intro-
ducing a national identity register were abandoned in 2011 [36, 37].
Formal personal identifiers
We have emphasized how systems of identity are designed to sepa-
rate entities in contexts, how they are established with widely vary-
ing standards of rigour, and that they are combined and compared
in all sorts of unanticipated ways. The fundamental personal identi-
fiers mentioned in the sub-Section ‘Examples’ are much used
because they carry weight: with the authority of the state, people are
identified in basic contexts for citizenship, employment, tax and
health.
Definition. A personal identity system has the form
PIdSys¼ (Identifier, Person j pid: Identifier! Person)
and satisfies the uniqueness property, namely two different people
are assigned different data and the function pid is one–one.
In practice, the data assigned to a person invariably includes a
number or alpha-numeric code precisely in order to enforce the
uniqueness property. All systems of identity need to be analysed by
studying comparisons that involve mapping between different sys-
tems of identity, but this is especially true of personal identity
systems.
Provenance of identifiers
Generating identifiers using other identifiers
Creating identifiers is an everyday occurrence: we open accounts,
register for services, buy products, etc. For many of these actions,
we rely on a handful of pre-existing identifiers. In the UK, to open a
bank account, we give a proof of our identity and our current
address, e.g. using a passport and a recent utility bill. To order a
product or service, an address and a credit card account number are
usually sufficient for the vendor to dispatch: notice the dependency
on the bank identifier. At face value, the quality of a bank identifier
is guaranteed by the databases of the state (passport, driver’s licence)
and local organizations (utility providers, local authorities). The
passport provides a high quality identifier based on a birth certifi-
cate, a photograph and possibly other biometric data. Example after
example, illustrates the general point that:
Principle. The creation of new identifiers is dependent upon pre-
existing identifiers.
The quality of an identifier is essentially a matter of its reliability,
which in turn depends on
i. its provenance, i.e. the process involved in establishing the iden-
tifier; and
ii. scope, i.e. the context(s) in which it is accepted.
In the case of people, a passport and a driving licence are stand-
ard examples of high-quality identifiers with a rigorous provenance
and wide application [38, 39]. In the case of a bank, where it is a
now a priority to check on identity of existing customers, the process
of identification can be clumsy and discriminatory, as women can
experience when using both their maiden name (in their profession)
and married name (in their personal life), which are often not linked
rigorously in practical ways.
The dependence of one identifier upon another may be illus-
trated in an identity dependence tree.
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Example 1: Bank Account. Consider the role of identifiers in
opening a bank account (in the UK), which is depicted in Fig. 1.
Establishing the identifier ID1 of the account holder involves provid-
ing evidence using five other identifiers: the validity of ID1 depends
upon, or is reduced to, the validities of ID2–ID6. Some of these iden-
tifiers have a special status, in that they are designed to reliably
denote an individual. In the example, these personal identifiers are
guaranteed by the state (ID4) and biometric data (ID5); in the latter
case, ID6 is used to allow a passport to be issued by post, without
face-to-face interaction. ID2 is used to confirm the validity of the
account holder’s address.
The identifiers that appear in the nodes of the tree suggest that
there can be quite complicated dependencies between systems of
identifiers for the same or, more commonly, different contexts. The
identifier is made by aggregating pre-existing identifiers: the bank
identifier in Fig. 1 is the sum of the identifiers for current address,
birth and image, etc.
Since identifiers are often built from other identifiers, of central
importance is the process of comparing identifiers and relating one
type of identifier to another. Indeed, there must be translations
between distinct systems for these identifiers for such methods to
work. All of these observations and ideas can be formalized to make
a precise and general mathematical framework for analysing identi-
fiers. The identity dependence tree is a flexible notion with many
more applications than proving personal identity.
Example 2: Namespaces. Namespaces are sets of identifiers that
use symbols to label, organize and classify entities by names. The
names can have a tree structure that enables them to be reused and
to form a hierarchy. For example, the names for directories, folders,
files, and web domains, etc. are made by concatenating names and
denote paths in a tree: the web address
http://www.swansea.ac.uk/library/archive-and-research-collec
tions/hocc
for the History of Computing Collection is a node belonging to the
archives which in turn belong to the library of Swansea University.
Indeed, there is no shortage of computing contexts where identity
dependence trees are used. Domain name systems (e.g. URLs), direc-
tory services for networks (e.g. Microsoft’s Active Directory), email
addresses (e.g. X500), authentication systems (e.g. Kerberos), and
public key infrastructures (e.g. blockchains) are natural sources of
rules and structures for creating identifiers.
Example 3: Identity Fraud. The creation of new personal identi-
ties requires many identifiers to be fabricated: birth certificates, driv-
ing licences, employment histories, etc. The practicalities for the
USA are discussed extensively in Kevin Mitnick’s memoir [40].
When a fugitive, his method for creating a new identity in different
states can be depicted as an identity dependence tree. More gener-
ally, Mitnick’s success at social engineering is based on his extensive
preparation, which focussed on researching identifiers that he would
use in masquerades in the technical, commercial and government
contexts of phone system companies, computer and phone manufac-
turers, and state agencies.
The complexity of computing systems suggests that tracing the
provenance of a component may lead to circularity and so there may
be a need for graphs of identifiers with cycles.
Generating identifiers from identifiers
Now suppose that to generate an identifier for an entity the input
data involves other identifiers that must be presented to verify some
of the new data (such as personal identity). The general ideas of the
sub-Section ‘Generating identifiers’ can be reformulated with prove-
nance in mind. We revise the processing of the form with a function
with new variables:
check: Forms  Identifier1  . . .  Identifierk! {0, 1}
that tests the data in a form f 2 Form and the information available
from identifiers i1, . . ., ik for consistency against the system’s rules.
Again, we assume that check(f, i1, . . ., ik)¼1 means that the form is
accepted and check(f, i1, . . ., ik)¼0 means that the form is rejected.
The identity of an entity with identifier i depends upon the iden-
tifiers i1, . . ., ik. This idea is formalised by re-representing the
function
generate: Forms! Identifier [ {reject}
(in section ‘Generating identifiers’) by the new function
generate: Forms  Identifier1  . . .  Identifierk! Identifier.
There are now two ways of creating the identifiers and defining
generate, defined by two principles:
Provenance Principle: Verification. The data in f 2 Form is suffi-
cient to create an identifier i. The data in the identifiers i1, . . ., ik are
used only to confirm or validate the data in f.
Here the function has the form
generate(f, i1, . . ., ik) ¼ if check(f, i1, . . ., ik)¼1 then issue (f) else
reject
noting that issue (f) does not need to know the validation identifiers.
Secondly, we have the more demanding case:
Figure 1: Dependency tree of identifiers
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Provenance Principle: Inheritance. The data in f 2 Form to create
an identifier i is inherited from the data in the identifiers i1, . . ., ik.
In this case, the function has the form
generate(f, i1, . . ., ik) ¼ if check(f, i1, . . ., ik)¼1 then issue
(f, i1, . . ., ik) else reject.
Comparing identifiers
Access to data belonging to different contexts is desirable in surveil-
lance, intelligence analysis, and academic research; it is undesirable
in social and personal contexts as it undermines privacy and free-
dom. Access is regulated by legal instruments.
Reductions between systems of identifiers
Consider the case where a set Entity of entities has two systems of
identifiers:
IdSys1¼ (Entity, Identifier1 j id1: Identifier1!Entity),
IdSys2¼ (Entity, Identifier2 j id2: Identifier2!Entity).
How can we relate or compare these systems?
One simple case is when the identifiers in Identifier1 can be asso-
ciated or matched with one or more identifiers in Identifier2, and
vice versa. This means that given an identifier i 2 Identifier1 of an
entity e 2 Entity, we can find corresponding identifiers in Identifier2
that are also identifiers for e. This is formalized as follows:
Definition. Let IdSys1 and IdSys2 be systems of identifiers for
Entity. A matching relation
r: Identifier1  Identifier2
for the systems of identifiers IdSys1 and IdSys2 compares identifiers
as to whether or not they are associated with the same entity in the
following sense: for every i 2 Identifier1 and j 2 Identifier2,
r(i, j) if, and only if, id1(i) ¼ id2(j).
Different conditions on a matching relation can be found in
examples, depending upon the properties of id1 and id2. An impor-
tant and common case is: given an identifier i 2 Identifier1 of an
entity e 2 Entity, we can find some corresponding identifier in
Identifier2 that is also an identifier for e. This is formalized as
follows:
Definition. Let IdSys1 and IdSys2 be systems of identifiers for
Entity. The system of identifiers IdSys1 is said to reduce to the sys-
tem of identifiers IdSys2 if there is a single-valued reduction
mapping
f: Identifier1!Identifier2
that calculates for each identifier in Identifier1 a corresponding iden-
tifier in Identifier2 for the same entity in the following sense: for
every i 2 Identifier1,
id1(i) ¼ id2(f(i)).
We write IdSys1 IdSys2 or, more simply and conveniently,
id1 id2 (see: Fig. 2).
This is but one formalization of the process of comparing the
identifiers of Identifier1 to those of Identifer2. Another option would
be to return a selection, or all, of the equivalent identifiers. Because
the notion of identifier is so abstract, the notion of reduction is very
general. Mappings between identifiers are ubiquitous in computing
systems and employ many algorithmic techniques. Reductions can
be found in situations where alternate terms like ‘translating’, ‘bind-
ing’, ‘matching’, and ‘tracing’ are used.
Example 1: Tracing. Consider the set Keep of keepers of vehicles
in the UK and two systems of identity for this set of entities.
Suppose, for simplicity, each keeper has one car and each keeper has
a unique address. Each car has a registration mark. Let the first sys-
tem be
Reg¼ (Keep, Regmk j reg: Regmk! Keep).
Every keeper has an address assigned by the postal service so let
Add¼ (Keep, Address j addr: Address! Keep).
Then the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) is
responsible for the determining the keeper’s address from the regis-
tration mark, which is defined formally by the reduction map red:
Regmk! Address such that for every registration mark r 2 Regmk,
reg(r) ¼ addr(red(r)).
We say that the system of identities Reg is reducible to Add.
Example 2: Hashing. In cybersecurity, hashing techniques provide
examples of reductions. For example, consider hashing in managing
passwords. Hashing involves a one-way function h: Password !
{0, 1}k where h(w) is a data used to separate w in some context.8
There are many hashing algorithms, such as the secure hash algo-
rithms SHA-256 and SHA-512; and there are methods to enhance
their security such as salting, where random strings are added to the
passwords to separate common passwords from each other. Thus,
hash codes are identifiers and the hash function and salting qualify as
reductions.
Example 3: Binding. Connections between computing entities
require various degrees of reliability and, in secure contexts, trust. In
computing, a binding is a mapping associating distinct entities in
hardware or software. Commonly, bindings are mappings between
syntactic spaces (e.g. namespaces) enabling binding to connect syn-
tactic and semantic entities, or to create layers in software stacks, or
create secure chains of identity in cryptography. The term binding
has general application and several common forms of binding qual-
ify as reductions between systems of identifiers in our sense.
Example 4: Certification. Certification is a security process that
seeks to increase trust in identity. It is intended to reduce risks of
man-in-the-middle vulnerabilities. In communications, such as call-
ing a webpage, certification can flag doubts about a website. In
cryptography, a public key certificate is used to confirm the owner-
ship of a public key. The certificate validates the binding of a pub-
lic–private key pair to an entity, using a digital signature generated
by a certificate authority.
Figure 2: Transformation of identifiers
8 A one-way function is easy to compute but hard to invert.
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Definition. The system of identifiers IdSys1 is said to be equiva-
lent to the system of identifiers IdSys2 if there are reduction
mappings
f: Identifier1! Identifier2 and g: Identifier2!Identifier1
that can exchange identifiers in Identifier1 and corresponding identi-
fiers in Identifier2. We write IdSys1 IdSys2 or, more simply and
conveniently, id1 id2.
Structuring the space of identifiers
Reductions are an important concept that occur widely. To con-
clude, we introduce some concepts and propositions to reveal the
richness of the reduction notion and signal the possibility of
advanced classification methods.
In the Section ‘Provenance of identifiers’, we discussed the com-
bination of identifiers. The process of creating new identifiers from
old introduces algebraic operations on spaces of identity systems.
One choice of algebraic structure, the semilattice, organizes the
space of all possible identity systems using reduction.
Lemma. Let IdSys(Entity) be the set of all identity systems for the
non-empty set Entity of entities. The reduction relation on
IdSys(Entity) is reflexive and transitive; and is an equivalence
relation on IdSys(Entity).
Proof. Let IdSys¼ (Entity, Identifier j id: Identifier ! Entity).
Trivially, id id using the identity function Identifier ! Identifier
as reduction map; so reduction is reflexive.
To show transitivity, let
IdSys1¼ (Entity, Identifier1 j id1: Identifier1!Entity),
IdSys2¼ (Entity, Identifier2 j id2: Identifier2!Entity),
IdSys3¼ (Entity, Identifier3 j id3: Identifier3!Entity).
and suppose
id1  id2 by f: Identifier1! Identifier2 and id2  id3 by g:
Identifier2! Identifier3.
Then, for i 2 Identifier1, and j 2 Identifier2, we have
id1(i) ¼ id2(f(i)) and id2(j) ¼ id3(g(j)).
Composing, f and g we have,
id1(i) ¼ id3(g(f(i)))
and id1 id3. It is easy to show that is symmetric.
Using the equivalence relationon IdSys(Entity), we define the
set of equivalence classes:
IdSys(Entity) ¼ IdSys(Entity)/.
The equivalence classes have the standard form of [id] for id 2
IdSys(Entity). The ordering relationon IdSys(Entity) induces
ordering relationon IdSys(Entity) by
[id1]  [id2] () id1  id2.
It is easy to check that is a partial ordering on IdSys(Entity).
Furthermore, the orderinghas the least upper bound property: for
any [id1], [id2] 2 IdSys(Entity), there is an element [id] such that:
i. [id] is an upper bound: [id1]  [id] and [id2]  [id];
ii. no lower element is a bound: if [id1]  [id0]  [id] then either
[id1]5 [id0] or [id0]5 [id].
To show this we construct an identity system as follows. Given
id1, id2 2 IdSys(Entity), take the disjoint union Identifier1 
Identifier2 of the sets of Identifier1, and Identifier2 and define
id1 id2: Identifier1  Identifier2 ! Entity.
wherein given i 2 Identifier1  Identifier2,
(id1  id2)(i) ¼ id1(i) if i 2 Identifier1
(id1  id2)(i) ¼ id2(i) if i 2 Identifier2.
It is easy to show that [id1  id2] satisfies conditions (i) and (ii).
The construction
(Identifier1  Identifier2 j id1  id2)
is called a co-product of the identity systems. If the sets Identifier1
and Identifier2 are disjoint (as is often the case) then the carrier is
their union.
Example: Combining Identifiers. Integration of identity data
can be tentatively explored using coproducts. Consider making a
system of identifiers for entities that are contracts, for which per-
sonal identity and current location must be validated. A space of
identifiers may be built using the coproducts of pairs of validat-
ing systems of identifiers: passports, driver licences, identity
cards for identity, and utility bills, local tax declarations for
addresses.
A partial ordering with the least upper bound property is called
an upper semilattice [41]. Thus, gathering together these arguments
we have the theorem:
Theorem. The reduction relation on IdSys(Entity) forms an upper
semilattice.
Corollary. The process of creating new identifiers by inheriting
existing identifiers forms an algebraic structure IdSys(Entity) that is
an upper semilattice under the reduction relation.
Equivalently, any upper semilattice can be reconstructed as an
algebraic structure with a binary operation ^ that is associative,
commutative, and idempotent [40]. In this form we would have the
structure
IdSys(Entity) ¼ (IdSys(Entity)/ j ^)
with binary operation of least upper bound defined by
[id1] ^ [id2]¼ [id1 id2].
Further properties of the upper semilattice IdSys(Entity) can be
developed depending upon properties of the associations and
reductions.
Concluding remarks
Employing simple examples and arguments from first principles,
we have used formal methods to analyse precisely concepts
involved in surveillance and identity. The formal analysis shows
that disparate forms of surveillance can be unified by abstract
mathematical definitions, and that (i) finding identities, and (ii)
sorting identities into categories, are fundamental in conceptualiz-
ing surveillance. The formal analysis of identity shows that the
idea of identity can be considered to be exclusively a matter of
data, and its diversity can be unified by abstract mathematical def-
initions. It also shows that (i) comparing identifiers, and (ii) trans-
lating between systems of identifiers, are fundamental to
understanding identity.
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Developing a theory of identity
The theoretical analysis presented here is intended to analyse exam-
ples and formalize intuitions and ideas. This formal approach is new
and inevitably modest, but it can serve as a basis for further concep-
tual and mathematical investigations relevant to the making and reg-
ulation of surveillance systems. Two conceptual and four technical
further directions seem to us to be desirable. Conceptually, our
theory of identifiers could be used to theorize privacy, interpreted as
the control identity. (A formal notion of anonymity was included in
the sub-Section ‘Surveillance: detecting attributes’.) The second
direction is to use identifiers to explore secure access control policies
in computer systems (e.g. role-based access control).
Turning to technical directions, first the notion of context in the
sub-Section ‘Behaviour as streams of data’ can be developed with
various semantic models. Further behavioural features can be for-
malized, such as the interaction of entities. There are options for for-
malizing streams – infinite or finite, total or partial streams in
discrete or continuous time – and for behaviours modelled as non-
deterministic and concurrent processes [42]. Secondly, logics can be
used to develop specification and reasoning about attributes. There
are several candidates, such as many sorted first order logic and its
many derivatives and its extensions – equational, Horn, and tempo-
ral logic [43]; and many valued logics [44]. Logics bring with them
tools that would expand the scope of the theory and applications.
Thirdly, the idea of a system of identifiers needs to be developed
mathematically. For example, identifiers commonly reference char-
acteristics of the entities that may be essential to their deployment
and application; this information is an additional component that
would enrich the mathematical structure of contexts and their iden-
tifiers. The idea of the form does provide background initial infor-
mation, but the characteristics of an entity may need updating
because of the behaviour of the entity in time. Systems of identifiers
are instances of abstract data types [25], whose extensive general
theory based on many sorted algebras and equations [18, 19, 45,
46] can add significantly to the theory and practice of identity.
Fourthly, identifiers are assumed to be digital objects. To model
this aspect, identifiers must themselves be coded by bits, i.e. by finite
binary strings over {0, 1}. This introduces a new digital layer
beneath the identifiers in which all computation actually takes place,
simulating functions on user data by functions on binary numbers.
This digital layer is a source of constraints on the theory of identi-
fiers. The digital layer can be modelled by maps of the form
code: Numbers! Identifier.
Classical computability theory is a mathematical theory of what
can and cannot be computed on numbers [47], especially binary and
decimal, etc. It has been applied to establish the scope and limits of
computation on arbitrary data using such maps as code; these maps
are called numberings in computability theory [48]. Thus, there is a
second ready-made theory that can applied to develop this three-
layer model:
id 8 code: Numbers! Identifier! Entity
and theorize what is, and what is not, computable about systems of
identifiers. The conception of identity analysed here is inspired by
and abstracts ideas about abstract data types and encodings cf. [49].
Formalizing identity and social theory
Ours is an investigation into ideas about surveillance and identity,
wherein our models are developed from first principles. It may seem
far from the world implied by the revelations of Snowden, with its
surveillance tools (XKeyscore, Tempora, etc.) for target discovery
and development. Let us observe that new surveillance contexts arise
— or are recognized — as more of our professional and social activ-
ities are carried out by abstract technological systems rather than by
direct face-to-face interactions. To make use of these systems, an
individual needs to give over some of his/her identity to distinguish
himself/herself from other users in the context. Thus, rather than
having a single and holistic identity, individuals now have many sep-
arated and overlapping identities, which amplifies hugely the scope
of a theory of identifiers.
The physical and the virtual are converging; indeed, it seems that
the physical world is being sucked into the virtual and a virtual
world is being created that is self-contained. It certainly exerts a
strong influence on the physical world, and shows signs of
autonomy. Thus, the components of monitoring and surveillance —
context, entity, observable behaviour, attribute and identity — will
seem natural in a world held together by data and software.
The multiplicity of contexts and identities, and the possibility of
the autonomy of the virtual world, requires the nature of identity to
be theorized. The formal framework we offer here is a rigorous anal-
ysis of the conceptual structure of surveillance; there ought to be
others. What can formalization contribute? Guided by the theory of
abstract data types, our formalization of identity aspires to:
i. establish and explore principles that assume identity is a matter
of data and their implications;
ii. make precise essential concepts and classify abstractly methods
of identification;
iii. provide a unified point of view that illuminates the design of
many real systems;
iv. explore the role of identity in aspects of security studies, includ-
ing monitoring and surveillance, personal privacy and trusted
translations and interactions.
At this stage, these aims require a great deal of further work.
Finally, let us observe that if a social science topic is closely asso-
ciated with abstract technologies that collect and process data effec-
tively then the specification of the software tools — i.e. what the
tools are designed to do for users — can be formalized in the same
way as we have approached the problem here. Thus, sociological
notions that motivate, shape and are ultimately represented in soft-
ware, can be defined in a formal framework which can be mathe-
matically analysed. In short, sociological theories about human
activities that are closely associated with abstract software systems
can be expected to have formal models, mathematical theories, as
well as oodles of data arising from their use.
To isolate, define and analyse ideas is the raison d’eˆtre of formal
methods, though in new areas their mathematical nature presents
obstacles to their reception and appreciation. The use of formal
methods to express and analyse general notions is established in
areas of philosophy and linguistics but seems to be rare in social
studies. Given software’s colonization of professional and social life,
and its promotion of monitoring and Big Data, the role of formal
methods to theorize social concepts and problems is destined to
grow.
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